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The Constitutional Right to Travel:  




“A rich man can choose to drive a limousine; a poor man may have to walk.”1  So 
declared the Ninth Circuit in 1972, when walking was a common phenomenon in the United 
States.2  Today, the overwhelming majority of Americans travel in a motor vehicle.3  This 
Comment will examine the implications of the institutional preference for motor vehicles, and 
the categorical exclusion of other modes of transportation in many segments of the transportation 
system.  Interstate highways, for example, usually exclude all forms of traffic except motor 
vehicles.4  Many public roads have no sidewalks for pedestrians, and no special facilities to 
accommodate bicyclists.5  Few roads, particularly in suburban and rural communities, offer any 
form of public transportation.6  
                                                 
1 Monarch Travel Servs. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, 466 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1972). 
 
2 See, e.g., Ann M. Dellinger & Laurie Beck, How Risky Is the Commute to School? Deaths and Injuries by 
Transportation Mode, TRANSP. RES. NEWS, Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 22, available at 
http://trb.org/publications/trnews/trnews237commute.pdf (“In the early 1970s . . . an estimated 66% of children 
walked to school.”). 
 
3 See, e.g., CLARA RESCHOVSKY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF: JOURNEY TO WORK 2000 3 (2004), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/c2kbr-33.pdf (finding that 88% of all commuters traveled to 
work by motor vehicle in the year 2000). 
 
4 Pedestrian and Bicycling Info. Ctr., FAQ's: Legal and Policy Issues, 
http://www.bicyclinginfo.org/insight/faqs/legal_policy.htm#seventh (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).  
 
5 THE GALLUP ORG., NAT'L SURV. OF PEDESTRIAN & BICYCLIST ATTITUDES & BEHAVS.: HIGHLIGHTS REPORT 5, 9 
(2002), available at http://www.walkinginfo.org/pdf/FinalBikePedSurveyHighlightsReport_v2.pdf (finding that 
bicycle lanes are available for 5% of bicycle trips, and one quarter of all pedestrian trips occur without a sidewalk or 
shoulder available).  
 
6 See, e.g., Surface Transp. Pol'y Project, Surface Transportation Policy Project Findings on the 2000 Census 
Journey-to-Work Figures, http://www.transact.org/report.asp?id=190 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (finding that only 
4% of America’s four million miles of roads are served by transit, either by bus or parallel train lines).  
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Without an automobile, many individuals in the U.S. are left without a means to reach 
their destination because they cannot drive.7  Many others cannot afford to use a motor vehicle.  
In the year 2000, the average annual cost to use a motor vehicle was $7363.8  The poorest fifth of 
American families pay forty-two percent of their income for the purchase, operation, and 
maintenance of automobiles.9  A famous cartoon illustrates the problem well -- a driver of a 
motor vehicle turns to his passenger and says, “I hate driving . . . But I need a car to get to 
work.”10  Later that day, the driver sits at work in a cubicle.  He turns to a co-worker and says, “I 
hate my job, but I gotta make car payments.”11
 At face value, the governmental preference for motor vehicles does not create a cause of 
action based on a constitutional right.12  This Comment will explore the constitutional 
ramifications of reduced access for non-motor vehicle travel, and focus on ways in which the 
Constitution might provide relief non-motorized forms of transportation.  
The major modes of transportation include private motor vehicles on highways 
(consisting of interstates and other roads), public transit (including buses and trains), bicycling, 
and walking.13  The ability to travel using these transportation modes is one of the basic building 
                                                 
7 Surface Transp. Pol'y Project, Transportation and Social Equity, 
http://www.transact.org/library/factsheets/equity.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2006)(finding that one-third of all 
Americans are either too young, too old, or infirm to drive).  
 
8 In 2005, the average cost of operating a passenger motor vehicle in the United States was $8410. Press Release, 
Am. Automobile Ass'n, Despite Higher Gas Prices, 2005 Driving Costs Nearly Unchanged from 2004, AAA Says 
(Mar. 21, 2005), http://www.aaanewsroom.net/Main/Default.asp?CategoryID=4&ArticleID=361. 
 
9 Surface Transp. Pol'y Project, supra note 7.  
 




12 See, e.g., Monarch Travel Servs. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, 466 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1972) (explaining that 
“[a] rich man can choose to drive a limousine; a poor man may have to walk. The poor man’s lack of choice in his 
mode of travel may be unfortunate, but it is not unconstitutional.”).  
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blocks of society.14  Roads, bridges, and other forms of transportation infrastructure are 
necessary for people to function in a modern community.15  Visits to a bank, school, or anywhere 
else utilize a form of transportation.  A community without transportation infrastructure becomes 
a community of inefficiency and chaos.16  Thomas Harris McDonald, the father of the American 
interstate road system,17 once noted, “next to the education of the child, road building is the 
greatest public responsibility.”18
The preference for road building and motor vehicles dominates the American psyche19 
and receives support at the highest levels of U.S. government.  In 2001, President George W. 
Bush’s Press Secretary was asked whether Americans “may have to adopt limits on their 
lifestyles as part of a national energy strategy.”20  The Press Secretary responded, the President 
"believes . . . that it should be the goal of policy makers to protect the American way of life.  The 
American way of life is a blessed one and we have a bounty of resources in this country.  It's not 
the presence of SUVs that has caused the problem."21
                                                                                                                                                             
13 See Bureau of Transp. Statistics, The Intermodal Transportation Database, http://www.transtats.bts.gov (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2006) (some of the other defined modes include aviation, maritime, freight railroads, and pipelines).  
 
14 See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. E2037 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993) (statement of Rep. Sabo) (stating that support of 
bicycling and walking “are essential to a viable intermodal transportation system.”).  
 
15 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H10913 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2005) (statement of Rep. Diaz-Balart) (“It is well-known 
that our transportation infrastructure is the backbone of the economy.  Obviously, its continued strength is essential 
to economic growth.”).   
 
16 Cf. Faye Fiore, Gulf Coast Besieged: Opening the Road to Safety Not Easy: An Urban Exodus from Disaster 
Generates Chaos for Cities that Can Barely Handle Daily Commutes, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2005, at A22. 
 
17 See TOM LEWIS, DIVIDED HIGHWAYS 5 (2d ed. 1999).  
 
18 Id. at 8.  
 
19 See generally JANE HOLTZ KAY, ASPHALT NATION (1997).  
 
20 Glen Johnson, Gas Prices Fuel Debate Over SUVS: Lawmakers May Demand Better Mileage, BOSTON GLOBE, 
May 13, 2001, at A1.  
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The dominance of the automobile as a policy choice of federal and state governments is 
undeniable.22  And yet, remarkably, American courts do not protect an individual’s right to use a 
motor vehicle.23  Courts have guarded the right to move freely, but they have not protected a 
person’s ability to choose a method of transport.24  
This Comment will explore the laws that affect an individual’s ability to choose a 
particular travel mode.  It will review the implications of legal rules that hinder the use of non-
motorized transportation modes.  The Comment is divided into four parts.  Part I places the legal 
discussion in context by describing the current problems with the transportation system, and by 
providing an overview of the evolution of the American transportation system from its 
beginnings to its present state.  Part II reviews cases involving constitutional rights to interstate 
travel and intrastate travel.25  Legal developments in the right to travel between states, and within 
one state, will provide insight into rights that might be attached to travel by a particular mode.  
Part III addresses the countervailing trends in the development of legal rights from the 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 Id. “SUV” refers to a sport utility vehicle.  In 2006, during his State of the Union Speech, President George W. 
Bush may have modified policy when he stated that “America is addicted to oil.” See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller & 
Adam Nagourney, Bush, Resetting Agenda, Says U.S. Must Cut Reliance On Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A6.  
However, if motor vehicles change energy sources, it does not logically follow that America’s reliance on them as a 
form of transportation will decrease. 
 
22 See KAY, supra note 19, at 270 (reporting that President Reagan called the private automobile the “last great 
freedom,” and then went on to attack passenger trains). 
 
23 See, e.g., Ducan v. Cone, No. 00-5705, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33221 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2000) (finding there is no 
fundamental right to drive a car); State v. Cox, 16 A.2d 508, 512 (N.H. 1940) (“The operation of an automobile 
upon the public highways is not a right but only a privilege.”) (internal citations omitted), aff’d Cox v. New 
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
 
24 Cf. People v. Sweetser, 140 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (“Although the members of the public have an 
inalienable right to use public highways in a reasonable manner without obstruction and interruption, this right is 
subject to the power of a county to impose reasonable regulations restricting the use of a county highway.”) 
(citations omitted); State in re Hoffman v. Potomac Edison Co., 170 A. 568, 570 (Md. 1934) (“a [transportation] use 
is usually held to be lawful and reasonable so long as it does not interfere with or endanger others lawfully and 
reasonably engaged in the use of the way.”). 
 
25 See generally Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the right to 
travel). 
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perspective of transportation modes.  While American courts have been quite unwilling to create 
a constitutional right to drive an automobile, the Supreme Court seems protective of a “freedom 
of movement” doctrine that protects an individual’s right to travel as a pedestrian.26  Part IV 
addresses the legal implications of the current transportation situation in the U.S.  The Comment 
concludes by arguing that a denial of access to the transportation system creates a cause of action 
under the federal equal protection doctrine of “total deprivation” laid out in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriquez.27   
 
PART I 
A. The Transportation Problem 
Transportation access directly affects many public policy issues.  Excessive use of motor 
vehicles damages the environment, reduces public health, and negatively influences land use 
patterns and the supply of affordable housing.28  Transportation access also has important 
consequences for homeland security because it ensures freedom of movement for security 
personnel responding to crises29 and for individuals trying to flee disasters.30
                                                 
26 See generally Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156 (1972); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 
(1958). 
 
27 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez 411 U.S. 1, 23 (1973) (finding that “lack of personal resources has not 
occasioned an absolute deprivation of the desired benefit” and is thus not a violation of equal protection). 
 
28 See, e.g., Surface Transp. Pol'y Project, Transportation and Health, 
http://www.transact.org/library/factsheets/health.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2006); Surface Transp. Pol'y Project, 
Transportation and Economic Prosperity, http://www.transact.org/library/factsheets/prosperity.asp (last visited Apr. 
1, 2006). 
 
29 See Robert D. McFadden, The Crash of Flight 587: Security; Lessons From Sept. 11 Are Followed in Quick 
Transportation Shutdowns and Restarts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2001, at D8. 
 
30 See, e.g., Jerry Adler, Ground Zero, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24, 2001, at 72. 
 
217 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY  VOL. 1, NO. 1 
 
The transportation problem in the U.S. will only worsen in the future.  The interstate 
highway system, as planned by the Federal Highway Administration, is largely built;31 today, 
fewer opportunities exist to build new roads or widen existing ones.  With the overall number of 
people and automobiles rising,32 more Americans will be forced onto a stagnant supply of 
transportation infrastructure.33  As these conditions worsen, conflicts over land use and 
transportation modes will become more frequent.34  Interest groups will fight over scarcer 
resources.35  Under these conditions, alternative transportation users will likely find it difficult to 
counteract the majoritarian tendencies of the motoring public. 
One need look no further than New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina to understand the 
importance of access to transportation.  On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina decimated New 
Orleans.36  Much of the city was built below sea level, and the hurricane destroyed nearby levees 
and flooded the city.37 Leading up to and after the hurricane, public officials tried unsuccessfully 
to organize a massive evacuation effort, in part by encouraging residents to flee the city.38  But 
many people, mostly African American,39 were simply too poor to leave New Orleans by car.40  
They needed a bus or another form of transportation to escape.41
                                                 
31 KAY, supra note 19, at 7. 
 
32 See id. at 270-71.  
 
33 See id. at 7, 14. 
 
34 See id. at 14-15. 
 
35  But cf. EDWARD BLAKELY, SHAPING THE AMERICAN DREAM: LAND USE CHOICES FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE 19-32 
(1993).   
 
36 See, e.g., John McQuaid, Alarm Sounded Too Late as N.O. Swamped, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 8, 
2005, at A10. 
 
37 See, e.g., id. 
 
38 See, e.g., James Dao, Lawmakers Question Louisiana Governor on Storm Response and Preparation, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 15, 2005, at A33. 
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The dilemma facing the poor in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina symbolizes the 
larger transportation problem facing the poor in the U.S.  They often bear the brunt of the 
nation’s transportation problems.  During the 1950s, the first major decade of interstate highway 
construction in the U.S., over 350,000 homes were raised, and new highways were often placed 
in poor communities.42  Today, even though most individuals live near road networks, ninety 
percent of former welfare recipients do not have access to a car.43  Less than half of all jobs in 
the U.S. are accessible by public transportation.44  Poorer individuals like welfare recipients, 
most of whom cannot or can only barely afford a car, are shut out from half of all jobs in the 
country.45  Compounding the problem, most cities do not provide public transportation during 
the second and third shift jobs that tend to be available to the poor.46 Unable to afford a car and 
without any method of commuting to work, many welfare recipients are unable to find jobs.47
                                                                                                                                                             
39 See, e.g., Gregory Stanford, Poverty a Storm that Batters the Poor Every Day, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 11, 
2005, at J4. 
 
40 See, e.g., James B. Johnson, 3 Bay Area Residents Share Escape Stories, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 4, 2005, at A27.  
 
41 See, e.g., Marc Sandalow, Katrina Thrusts Race and Poverty onto National Stage, S.F. CHRON., Sep. 23, 2005, at 
A13. 
 
42 Surface Transp. Pol'y Project, supra note 7. 
 




45 Surface Transp. Pol'y Project, Transportation and Poverty Alleviation, 
http://www.transact.org/library/factsheets/poverty.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2006)(finding that three in every five jobs 




47 Id.  
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On the other side of the coin, Americans above the poverty level48 own more cars than 
they used to, and are driving longer distances.49  They have the ability to devote substantial 
resources to automotive travel and can take advantage of the car-centric transportation system.50
American courts generally consider restrictions on forms of travel lawful under a state’s 
discretion to exercise its police power.51  If a state deems it unsafe for a person to use a motor 
vehicle, the state is within its power to revoke his or her driver’s license.52  This general 
authorization of a state’s police power, however, does not contemplate an increasingly likely 
scenario -- what if a person does not own a car, and cannot afford a car?  Further, what if there 
are no forms of public transportation available for that person?  If a state, through its police 
power, can restrict an individual’s use of a motor vehicle, they can presumably restrict others 
forms of transportation, such as walking and bicycling.53  If a state uses its police power to 
restrict bicycling and walking, a person without a motor vehicle may not be able to reach a job or 
other important destinations. 
In many cases, units of government do not need to pass regulations that explicitly restrict 
alternative forms of travel.  The design of the facility will be enough to deter usage by non-
                                                 
 
48 The poverty line is the gross income below the standard threshold needed to acquire necessities for living. The 
U.S. Census Bureau sets the poverty line for families and individuals depending upon age. For example, for a family 
of two, both below the age of sixty-five, the 2003 poverty line was $12,649. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY 
THRESHOLDS 2004 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld/thresh04.html. 
 
49 58.5 million households owned two automobiles in 2000, and eighteen million households owned three or more 
vehicles. These figures are increases over previous U.S. Census reports. Surface Transp. Pol'y Project, supra note 6. 
 
50 See KAY, supra note 19, at 120-23. 
 
51 See, e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979) (finding that reasonable restrictions on travel, such as deterring 
drunk driving, are constitutional under a state’s authority to exercise its regulatory powers).  
 
52 Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977).  
 
53 The Fifth Circuit has ruled that bicyclists do not have a cause of action under federal transportation law to 
challenge agency actions for failure to consider bicycle safety in transportation projects.  Lundeen v. Mineta, 291 
F.3d 300, 310 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that Congress “anticipated that the failure to consider specific factors in 
planning a particular transportation project -- even bicycle safety -- would not be judicially reviewable.”). 
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motorized transportation such that it becomes practically impossible to travel other than by 
motor vehicle.  Even if a road remains legally open to bicyclists and pedestrians, it may be very 
unsafe if it is not designed for them.54  Further compounding the problem, roads that fit civil 
engineering guidelines55 are often perceived as unsafe by alternative transportation users.56   
The “Green Book,” published by the American Association of State and Highway 
Transportation Officials (AASHTO), is the pre-eminent civil engineering manual in the U.S. for 
designing roads.57  First published in 1956, it contains guidance on everything from the 
appropriate width of a roadway to the proper placement of a drainage grates.58  Until 2001, the 
stated mission of the AASHTO Green Book was “to provide operational efficiency, comfort, 
safety, and convenience for the motorist."59  As noted by one commentator, “the needs of 
                                                 
 
54 See, e.g., Mass. Bicycle Coalition, Policies,  http://massbike.org/about/policies.htm#roads (last visited Apr. 1, 
2006). 
 
55 It is worth noting that significant disagreement exists about the definition of a safe facility for alternative 
transportation, particularly in the bicycle community.  For example, some bicycle experts believe that bicycle lanes 
are the safest form of bicycle travel, while others believe that bicycle travel is most safely performed in the normal 
roadway.  See, e.g., WAYNE FEIN, CRITIQUE OF SHARED-USE FACILITIES FOR BICYCLES AND MOTOR VEHICLES 1 
(2004), available at http://www.humantransport.org/bicycledriving/library/SharedUse_critique.pdf (taking the 
position that there is insufficient evidence that bike lanes are safer than wide outside lanes).  For those taking the 
latter view, they often believe that the current road system is sufficient for safe bicycle use and see education as the 
primary method of increasing bicycle mode safety.  See generally JOHN FORRESTER, EFFECTIVE CYCLING 1 (6th ed. 
1993).  From a macro perspective, both sides are probably correct, in the sense that bicycle facilities are appropriate 
in some contexts and inappropriate in others.  In any event, most cyclists seem to support the creation of more 
bicycle facilities. The Gallup Org., supra note 13, at 5 (finding that almost half of cyclists surveyed recommended 
changes to the transportation system, and of those desiring changes, 73% wanted more bicycle facilities). 
 
56 See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., 2005 TRAVELER OPINION AND PERCEPTION (TOP) SURVEY, DETAILED FINDING, 
SAFETY (2005), available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/traveleropinions/6.htm. 
  





59 AM. ASS'N OF ST. AND HIGHWAY TRANSP. OFFICIALS, A POLICY ON GEOMETRIC DESIGN xliv (1994).
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pedestrians and bicyclists [in the Green Book], and the effects of roadway projects on the 
environment and communities[,] are secondary.”60
Available safety data strongly suggests that many roads are not safe for non-motorized 
forms of transportation.61  Roughly 5000 pedestrians and bicyclists are killed on the public 
roadways each year,62 but only 1.9% of available federal safety funds are spent on bicycle and 
pedestrian safety annually.63  By contrast, bicyclists and pedestrians account for over 13% of all 
fatalities that occur on roadways.64
The poor in the U.S. are left in a quandary.  They cannot afford a car, and the state may 
curtail their ability to use other transportation modes, sometimes intentionally.65  Even if their 
rights to use other modes are not curtailed, a strong probability exists that they do not think they 
                                                 
 
60 Stephen Burrington, Conservation Law Foundation, Take Back Your Streets(1998), 
http://www.clf.org/general/index.asp?id=383. In the 2001 edition of the Green Book, AASHTO deleted the motorist 
centered language from its mission statement, but the actual content of the manual remained largely the same from 
the 1994 edition. Compare AM. ASS'N OF ST. AND HIGHWAY TRANSP. OFFICIALS, A POLICY ON GEOMETRIC DESIGN 
(2001) with AM. ASS'N OF ST. AND HIGHWAY TRANSP. OFFICIALS, supra note 59. 
 
61 See, e.g., NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 1 (2002), available at 
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSF2002/2002pcyfacts.pdf (finding that in 2002, 667 cyclists were 
killed and 48,000 were injured).  It is somewhat debatable whether the source of these crashes was poor design or 
user behavior.  See supra note 55. 
 
62 Id. at 2. 
 
63 America Bikes, Bicycle Pedestrian Fatality Data, 




65 See, e.g., John Tuohy, IndyGo’s Passengers Don’t Fit in 1 Mold, Some Say Taking the Bus is Their Choice, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 29, 2004, at 1B (reporting that the local transit agency has intentionally under-funded its 
transportation service since 1975). 
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have safe facilities nearby to bicycle or walk.66  Nor do they likely have reasonable access to 
public transportation if they live anywhere outside of a large city.67
Compounding the problem is the fact that many public transportation users are 
minorities.  “Nationally, public transportation users are disproportionately minorities with low to 
moderate incomes.”68  Minorities are hit hardest in cities, where “[A]frican Americans and 
Latinos together comprise 54 percent of public transportation users . . . [nationally] just 7 percent 
of white households do not own a car, compared with 24 percent of African American 
households, 17 percent of Latino households, and 13 percent of Asian American households.”69  
Minority populations are hit harder when public transportation is not available.70  Sidewalks and 
other engineering solutions create a safe environment for alternative transportation.  In many 
cases, if safe facilities existed, it would be possible to travel by non-motorized transportation: 
According to the 1995 Nationwide Personal Transportation 
Survey, 25% of all trips are made within a mile of the home, 40% 
of all trips are within two miles of the home, and 50% of the 
working population commutes five miles or less to work - all 
distances easily traveled by bike. Yet more than 82% of trips five 
miles or less are made by personal motor vehicle.71     
       
                                                 
 
66 See supra notes 55-56; BUREAU OF TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS, 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY OF PEDESTRIAN AND 
BICYCLIST ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS 5 (2002), available at 
http://www.walkinginfo.org/pdf/FinalBikePedSurveyHighlightsReport_v2.pdf. 
 
67 See, e.g., Surface Transp. Pol’y Project, STPP Findings on the 2000 Census Journey-to0Work Figures, 
http://www.transact.org/report.asp?id=190 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (finding that public transportation systems are 
usually available in most larger American cities but not in suburbs). 
 
68 THOMAS SANCHEZ ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY MOVING TO EQUITY: 
ADDRESSING INEQUITABLE EFFECTS OF TRANSPORTATION POLICIES ON MINORITIES vii (2003), available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/transportation/MovingtoEquity.pdf. 
 
69 Id.  
 
70 See Surface Transp. Pol’y Project, Transportation and Social Equity, 
http://www.transact.org/library/factsheets/equity.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).  
 
71 Bicycle Friendly Community Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.bicyclefriendlycommunity.org/faqs.htm 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2006). 
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Despite the high cost of motor vehicles,72 public transportation programs frequently 
come under attack.73  Motor vehicles themselves, however, are highly subsidized in the U.S.  In 
2002, local governments spent $27.9 billion on local roads (non-interstate roads), where most 
pedestrian and bicycle travel occurs.74  Roadway user charges covered only $3.1 billion of the 
$27.9 billion tab.75  Nationally, including bond financing, taxes and fees on motor vehicle usage 
account for only 70% of all roadway expenditures; fuel taxes would need to rise 45% to cover all 
roadway costs.76
Non-motorized transportation infrastructure and programs do not always require large 
sums of public funding.  In the context of new land development, governments can use exactions 
to make roadways more bicycle and pedestrian friendly.77  Additionally, bicycle and pedestrian 
friendly design elements do not necessarily increase the cost of a roadway project.78  In the 
context of public transportation, removing people from cars and putting them onto buses, trains, 
                                                 
 
72 See supra note 8. 
 
73 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 1210 (2005) (statement of Rep. Cummings) (“Particularly during the last 5 years, 
Amtrak has repeatedly faced threatened shutdowns and proposed elimination of its operating subsidy.”). 
 






77 Cf. Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 395 (1994) (“Dedications for streets, sidewalks, and other public ways are 
generally reasonable exactions to avoid excessive congestion from a proposed property use.”). 
 
78 See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, PROJECT DEVELOPMENT AND DESIGN GUIDE, 5-19 (2006), 
available at http://www.vhb.com/mhdGuide/pdf/CH_5_a.pdf (“if motor vehicle speeds are too high, the designer 
should consider selecting a lower motor vehicle design speed to increase the comfort and safety of the facility for 
bicycles. Additionally, the designer could consider narrowing motor vehicle lanes to provide wider shoulders.”).  
This guidance shows that civil engineers can take a limited amount of road and make it safer for bicyclists while still 
allowing motor vehicles to travel safely.  
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and boats mitigates hidden societal costs.79  Some have argued that public transportation costs 
are offset by reduced expenditures in other government sectors.80
In the final analysis, travel in the U.S. is largely wedded to motor vehicle use, even if 
American courts refuse to protect motorized travel as an individual right.81  But how did we get 
to this point in the first place?  Automobiles, after all, were not produced in any quantity until the 
turn of the twentieth century.82  Examining the development of transportation infrastructure in 
the U.S. will lend insight into the so-called constitutional rights to interstate travel, intrastate 
travel, and freedom of movement.     
 
B. A Short History of the Early Development of the American Transportation Infrastructure 
 
 In the early days of the American republic, zoning laws did not exist.83  There was no 
large railway system, and residential and commercial uses tended to be in close proximity to 
each other.84  “Until the mid-1800s, the practical distance for commuting was limited to the 
range of a horse and coach.”85
                                                 
 
79 Cf. Clifford Cobb, The Roads Aren’t Free, CHALLENGE, May-June 1999, at 63-83. 
 
80 See Sonja Ryst, Sector Spotlight: Public Good, Fiscal Risk: Mass Transit's Delicate Balance, THE BOND BUYER, 
July 8, 1999, at 7. 
 
81 See, e.g., Ducan v. Cone, No. 00-5705, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33221 (6th Cir. filed Dec. 7, 2000) (finding that 
there is no fundamental right to drive a car even when a car is the primary method of travel for society, as explained 
in Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 
82 RUSSELL BOURNE, AMERICAN ON THE MOVE: A HISTORY OF WATERWAYS, RAILWAYS, AND HIGHWAYS 112-17 
(1995). 
 
83 JAMES HOWARD KUNTSLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE 34 (1993).  
 
84 Id.  
 
85 Id. at 46.  
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As the industrial revolution grew in the 1800s, however, wealthy citizens began moving 
out of the downtown core in urban areas.86  Factories required large numbers of workers, and 
large numbers of workers required massive amounts of housing in cities.87  In New York City, 
for example, the population grew from 696,115 in 1850 to 3,437,202 by 1900.88  The advent of 
the railroad enabled wealthier individuals to live farther away from the center of urban cities.89  
For example, in the mid to late 1800s, many of Chicago’s elite moved to Riverside, nine miles 
away from downtown Chicago.90  Each house in the neighborhood sat within ten minutes 
walking distance from the train.91  Eventually, Riverside developed into one of the first 
“suburbs,” as commercial development sprung up to serve the new community.92  This is one of 
the first examples of “sprawl” that now dominates American land use.93  
Sprawl is the “[h]aphazard growth or extension outward, especially that resulting from 
real estate development on the outskirts of a city.”94  With the advent of sprawl, available jobs 
move away from the center of cities to suburbs, making it more difficult for urban dwellers to 
                                                 
 
86 Id. at 55-57. 
 
87 Id. at 60. 
 
88 Id. at 36.  
 
89 Id. at 55-57. 
 




92 Id. at 51.  
 
93 Id. (explaining that Riverside represented country living accessible to a city but removed from its problems, but 
that it was a far cry from the suburbs created by the automobile culture); see generally KAY, supra note 19 
(surveying the relationship between the automobile and sprawl). 
 
94 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1682 (4th ed. 2000).
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find employment.95  Sprawl also has significant environmental and infrastructural costs,96 and a 
severe impact on the public health of residents living within sprawl areas.97
Between 1890 and 1915, before sprawl was a common occurrence, the electric streetcar 
and the motor vehicle came into wide use.98  In the early years of the automotive industry, 
streetcar companies did not receive large tax subsidies, while private automobile manufacturers 
benefited from massive public expenditures in the form of road building.99  Another form of 
transportation, the bicycle, also came into wide use around this time.100  Bicyclists needed 
smooth surfaces to operate, and Albert Pope, the inventor of the modern bicycle, founded the 
“Good Roads” movement:101
By 1900, more than 300 companies were producing over a million 
bicycles a year. Pope did not stop with manufacturing but turned 
his attention to road conditions bicyclists had to endure. "American 
roads are among the worst in the civilized world, and always have 
been," he wrote in a pamphlet entitled Highway Improvement. "I 
hope to live to see the time when all over our land, our cities, 
towns, and villages shall be connected by as good roads as can be 
found." Pope organized riders into an early lobbying group, The 
League of American Wheelmen, financed courses in road 
engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and built 
a short stretch of macadam road in Boston to give people an idea 
how wonderful a smooth pavement could be. He helped persuade 
the Commonwealth government of Massachusetts to create a 
                                                 
 
95 See Surface Transp. Pol’y Project, Transportation and Poverty Alleviation, 
http://www.transact.org/library/factsheets/poverty.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2006). 
 
96 See, e.g., KAY, supra note 19, at 130-34.   
 
97 See, e.g., Smart Growth America, Measuring the Health Effects of Sprawl (finding that communities with greater 
sprawl cause residents to have more health problems), http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/healthreportes.html (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2006). 
 
98 KUNTSLER, supra note 83, at 86-87. 
 
99 Id. at 87. 
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highway commission. By the turn of the century, the "Good Roads" 
movement was sweeping the country. The League of American 
Wheelmen became the first highway lobby group that served as a 
model for others to follow. Through its own publication, Good 
Roads, the League supported "good roads" associations across the 
country; it supported good roads conventions and argued 
ceaselessly before state legislatures for road improvements.102
 
As bicycling grew into a phenomenon in America, states and municipalities and 
governments began enacting and enforcing safety laws.103  Many municipalities banned bicycles 
altogether because they scared horses.104  State supreme courts almost uniformly upheld these 
bans until the late 1880s.105  The legal trend soon changed around the turn of the century, 
however, and many courts afforded bicyclists legal rights.106
The early bicycle rulings show that bicyclists were not only legally allowed to use roads 
in the United States, but that they were expected to.107  If bicyclists were not allowed to use the 
roads, they would have been totally restricted from riding because they were banned from riding 
on sidewalks.108  Faced with such a harsh result, it is not surprising that state courts shied away 
from a total denial of bicycle use throughout the transportation system. 
                                                 
 
102 Id. at 7-8. 
 
103 Ross Petty, The Impact of the Sport of Bicycle Riding on the Safety Law, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 185 (1998). 
 
104 Id. at 193.  
 
105 Id.  
 
106 Id. at 195-96 (“ruling[s] giving cyclists equal rights on roadways soon became widely adopted . . . [one] decision 
ruled that bicycle riders were not allowed to practice their sport on the sidewalk”) (internal citations omitted).  By 
not allowing bicyclists to ride on the sidewalk, the court required bicyclists to ride in the street like any other vehicle 
and thus be considered part of the regular traffic flow. 
 
107 Id. at 196.  
 
108 Id. at 195-96. 
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While bicycling was reaching the peak of its popularity, the automobile began its steady 
ascent to the prominence it has enjoyed since the 1950s.109  The automobile lobby initially 
joined with Albert Pope’s “Good Roads” movement.110  In 1893, the League of American 
Wheelmen and Pope had convinced President Grover Cleveland’s staff to create a new “Office 
of Road Inquiry,” in hopes of educating the public about the benefits of paved roads.111  Around 
this time, there were about three million miles of roads in America, but only three hundred fifty-
thousand miles of them had any kind of smooth surface.112  
Before paved streets become prevalent throughout the country, most Americans traveled 
by foot, horse, water, or railroad;113 and after the 1860s, many Americans also bicycled.114  The 
automobile industry benefited from the “Good Roads” lobbying efforts to pave roads, and 
automobile registrations grew from 8,000 in 1900 to 469,000 by 1910.115  By 1914, the “Office 
of Road Inquiry,” originally intended to pave roads for bicyclists, became the Bureau of 
Independent Roads.116  By 1916, 3.5 million automobiles were in existence,117 and the federal 
government began appropriating large sums of funding for road building, although World War I 
initially impeded construction efforts.118  By 1930, the Federal Bureau of Public Roads had spent 
                                                 
 
109 LEWIS, supra note 17, at 23-24.  
 




112 Id. at 10. 
 
113 See generally BOURNE, supra note 83. 
 
114 Petty, supra note 103, at 187. 
 
115 LEWIS, supra note 17, at 10-11; KAY, supra note 19, at 142. 
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$750 million dollars and created the imprint of the national highway system that would follow 
decades later.119
The years 1900 to 1920 were also the golden age of streetcars in the United States.  From 
1890 to 1920, streetcar ridership increased from 2 to 15.5 million passengers annually.120  
During this period, local governments required streetcar companies to pay all of their operating 
costs, while automobile companies were not required to subsidize road building.121  The City of 
Chicago, for example, “spent $340 million on road widening between 1910 and 1940.”122  
As vehicle production and road construction grew, so did the large trucking industry that 
ultimately decimated the railroads.123  Unlike the mature railroad industry, the trucking industry 
went largely unregulated until 1935.124  In 1915, the railroad industry had 1.8 million employees, 
carried 1.5 million passengers, and moved over 2 million tons of freight.125  Railroad companies 
faltered, however, as federal highway funding continued to increase, ostensibly to “relieve 
railroad congestion” by providing roads for trucks.126  Congress and President Roosevelt spent 
over $1.8 billion on road construction in the years leading up to World War II.127
                                                                                                                                                             
118 LEWIS, supra note 17, at 11 (explaining that Congress appropriated seventy five million dollars to road building 
in 1916, but only $500,000 was actually spent during the war).  
 
119 Id. at 18. 
 
120 KAY, supra note 19, at 142. 
 




123 LEWIS, supra note 17, at 21-22.  
 




126 Id. at 22 (explaining that throughout the Great Depression, federal road building subsidies continued to increase, 
which led to the rapid decline of railroads). 
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Meanwhile, streetcar companies were under attack from automobile manufacturers.  
Many governments required streetcar companies to guarantee a low fare in exchange for the 
privilege to operate on public streets, and did not allow them to cease operations on unprofitable 
routes.128  Automobile manufacturers understood the weakened position of the streetcar 
companies and acted.  “The General Motors Corporation undertook a systemic campaign to put 
streetcar lines out of business all over America . . . [by] using its financial muscle to buy up 
streetcar lines, scrap the tracks, and convert the routes to buses.”129  In 1949, a federal grand jury 
indicted General Motors for criminal conspiracy; it emerged unscathed after paying a $5000 
fine.130
With railroad and streetcar companies out of the picture, automobile manufacturers had 
no major competitors after World War II.131  In 1956, President Dwight Eisenhower formed the 
President’s Advisory Committee on a National Highway Program, and the Interstate Highway 
System was born.132  Between 1956 and 1991, the federal government spent about $50 billion a 
year on road construction, funded largely by federal gasoline taxes.133  The Interstate National 
Highway System project eventually yielded 41,000 miles of new roads. 
                                                                                                                                                             
127 Id. at 22-23.  In the 19th century, railroads also received subsidies from government before becoming highly 
regulated. STEPHEN B. GODDARD, GETTING THERE: THE EPIC STRUGGLE BETWEEN ROAD AND RAIL IN THE 
AMERICAN CENTURY 8-42 (1994).  Many in the railroad industry at that time were also corrupt or engaged in 
questionable business practices.  See BOURNE, supra note 82, at 95-96, 107-09, 122. 
 
128 KUNTSLER, supra note 83, at 90. 
 
129 Id.  
 
130 Id. at 92.  
 
131 The story of the transportation infrastructure post World War II is both well known and well documented, and 
there is no need to cover it in detail here.  See, e.g., DAN MCNICHOL, THE ROADS THAT BUILT AMERICA, THE 
INCREDIBLE STORY OF THE U.S. INTERSTATE SYSTEM (2005); WILLIAM KASZYNSKI, THE AMERICAN HIGHWAY: THE 
HISTORY AND CULTURE OF ROADS IN THE UNITED STATES (2000); GODDARD, supra note 127, at 179-245; MARK H. 
ROSE, INTERSTATE: EXPRESS HIGHWAY POLITICS 1939-1989.  
 
132 KAY, supra note 19, at 231. 
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In 1991, Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, which 
re-defined the federal government’s role in transportation policy.134  Since 1991, the states have 
played a larger role in allocating federal transportation dollars.135  More funding has been 
available for alternative forms of transportation such as bicycling and walking,136 but the vast 
majority of transportation funding continues to support motorized transportation on roadways.137
 
Part II 
A. The Constitutional Right to Interstate Travel 
 
 The Supreme Court has used the right to interstate travel to strike down residency 
requirements for welfare benefits,138 voting laws,139 to protect an individual’s free movement 
from interference by non-state actors,140 and to prohibit a state from excluding indigents.141  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
133 Id.  
 
134 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-240 (1991).  Reauthorizations to the 
original 1991 version were passed in 1997, 105 Pub. L. No. 178 (1997), and 2005, 109 Pub. L. No. 59 (2005).  They 
include minor changes, but the overall original structure is still intact. See generally Federal Highway 
Administration, Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (2005), 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/safetealu/safetea-lu_summary.pdf. 
 
135 The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act required the states to implement long range transportation 
plans and to create Metropolitan Planning Organizations that vote on the distribution of transportation funds. See 
Federal Highway Administration, supra note 134. 
 
136 Since 1991, about 1% of all federal transportation funds have been available for bicycling and walking – a 
significant increase over pre-1991 levels. Id.; see also BIKES BELONG COALITION, GUIDE TO BICYCLE ADVOCACY 7 
(1999), http://www.toolstudios.com/bikesbelong/Advocacy%20Guide.pdf. 
 
137 See, e.g., SURFACE TRANSP. POL’Y PROJECT, THE TRANSPORTATION FUNDING LOOPHOLE (2002), 
http://www.transact.org/library/decoder/ObligationLimit.pdf. 
 
138 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).  
 
139 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).  
 
140 See, e.g., Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 470 U.S. 898 (1986). 
 
141 See, e.g., Edwards v. Cal., 314 U.S. 160 (1941).  
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main purpose of this section is to explain the various factual situations in which courts have 
upheld a poor individual’s right to interstate travel.  This overview will help inform the total 
deprivation doctrine analysis described later in this Comment.142
Federal case law and commentary make it clear that a constitutional right to travel 
between states exists.143  Various members of the Supreme Court have derived this right from 
different constitutional sources.  In Oregon v. Mitchell, Justice Harlan noted that the right to 
interstate travel is a “nebulous judicial construct” that could not be found in any one particular 
clause of the Constitution.144  Other sources of the right to interstate travel have included the 
Privileges and Immunities Clauses in Article IV145 and the Fourteenth Amendment,146 the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,147 the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,148 and the Commerce Clause in Article III, Section 8.149   
Article Four of the Articles of Confederation also addressed the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship.  The Articles version contained additional language not included in 
the Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.150  Article Four of the Articles of 
Confederation reads: 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
142 See infra Part IV.  
 
143 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999); Jide Nzelibe, Free Movement: A Federalist Interpretation, 49 AM. 
U.L. REV. 433 (1999); Sheldon Shapiro, Annotation: Federal Constitutional Right of Interstate Travel – Supreme 
Court Cases, 27 L. ED. 2D 862 (2005).  
 
144 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 215 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 
145 See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
 
146 See, e.g., Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112.  
 
147 See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).  
 
148 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).  
 
149 See, e.g., Edwards v. Cal., 314 U.S. 160 (1969). 
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The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and 
intercourse among the people of the different states in this union, 
the free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds 
and fugitives from Justice excepted, shall be entitled to all 
privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states, 
and the people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to 
and from any other state.151 
 
 Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution does not include the “free ingress and regress” 
or the “paupers [and] vagabonds” language found in the Articles of Confederation.  The 
Constitution reads: “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities 
of Citizens in the several States.”152  Many commentators have theorized that the framers 
assumed the language used in the Articles of Confederation was obviously implicit in the 
meaning of “Privileges and Immunities” and did not need to be included in the Constitution.153
 If the Articles of Confederation’s “Privileges and Immunities” clause was intended to be 
incorporated into the Constitution, important implications follow.  The Articles clause does not 
extend the right to interstate travel to “paupers, vagabonds and fugitives.”154  In today’s world, 
paupers and vagabonds could mean those below the poverty line.  Presumably, in 1781, when the 
Articles of Confederation were passed, “paupers” and “vagabonds” applied to those traveling on 
foot because they could not afford a horse or other form of transportation.  Under the law of the 
Articles, a state could thus deny entry to poor pedestrians.  But as we will see later, while right to 
travel jurisprudence does not defend a person’s right to travel using more expensive forms of 
                                                                                                                                                             
150 Nicole Hyland, Comment, On the Road Again: How Much Mileage is Left on the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause and How Far Will It Travel?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 187, 196 (2001). 
 
151 ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (1781). 
 
152 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.  
 
153 See, e.g., Nzelibe, supra note 143, at 439-40. 
 
154 ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (1781). 
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transportation, it does generally protect the right to travel on foot.155  The Court has even struck 
down a law that punished individuals for helping indigents cross state lines.156  These tendencies 
seem to cut against the incorporation of the Articles of Confederation definition of “Privileges 
and Immunities” into the Constitution.157  This is an important point.  If the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment are read to preclude extension 
of the right to travel to paupers and vagabonds, the poor may not have an equal protection claim 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.158
Many of the Supreme Court’s cases that involve the right to interstate travel include fact 
patterns that implicate distinct travel modes and the economic status of the travelers.159  Most of 
the situations in which the Court has invoked the right to interstate travel involve situations 
where poorer members of society are likely to be impacted by a travel restriction.  In Crandall v. 
Nevada, decided in 1868, the Court invalidated a Nevada statute that allowed the state to tax 
travelers one dollar as they entered or exited the state by railroad.160  The Court rejected the law, 
reasoning that “if the State can tax a railroad passenger one dollar, it can tax him one thousand 
                                                 
155 See infra notes 278-92 and accompanying text. 
 
156 See, e.g., Edwards v. Cal., 314 U.S. 172 (1941) (striking down a state law that punished residents for aiding the 
transport of indigents into the state). 
 
157 Under a strict textualist definition, the Privilege and Immunities Clause in Article IV would not lead to a 
restriction of travel for “paupers and vagabonds,” because those words do not appear in the Constitution.  Nzelibe, 
supra note 143, at 463.  The “paupers and vagabonds” reference only appears in the Articles of Confederation 
definition of Privilege and Immunities.  See supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text. 
 
158 See infra Part IV (discussing ways the poor can use equal protection to challenge state transportation policies).  In 
the Supreme Court’s most recent right to interstate travel decision, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), it grounded 
one aspect of right to travel in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and another 
aspect in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution. 
 
159 See, e.g., Saenz, 526 U.S. 489; Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
 
160 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1868); see also Edwards, 314 U.S. 172. 
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dollars.”161  The Court also seemed particularly concerned with keeping major transportation 
routes open for the majority of citizenry.162  The Crandall Court emphasized that “we are all 
citizens of the United States, and as members of the same community must have the right to pass 
and repass through every part of it without interruption.”163  Specifically mentioning “all 
citizens,” the Court implicitly included indigent passengers who presumably would have little 
impact on the commerce or the prosperity of the individual states. 
Beginning in 1969, the Supreme Court started striking down laws that denied benefits to 
newer poor residents of states.  States typically restricted benefits to newer residents by denying 
services until the individuals satisfied durational residency requirements.164  This line of cases is 
important because it illustrates the “penalty” test the Court has used to assess factual situations 
involving the poor and the right to travel.   
In Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court struck down a law that denied welfare benefits to 
residents until they had lived in the state for at least one year.165  The Court reasoned that the 
residency requirement amounted to an unconstitutional classification under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection clause.166  The Shapiro decision held that “any classification 
                                                 
 
161 Crandall, 73 U.S. at 46.  
 
162 Id. (noting that if the tax was upheld, then “one or more States covering the only practicable routes of travel . . . 
may totally prevent or seriously burden all transportation of passengers from one part of the country to the other.”). 
 
163 Id. at 49.  
 
164 A large volume of commentary exists on the relationship between the right to interstate travel and welfare 
benefits. See, e.g., Bryan H. Wildenthal, State Parochialism, the Right to Travel, and the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (1989); Calvert Chipcase, Note, Saenz v. Roe: The Right to Travel, 
Durational Residency Requirements and a Misapplication of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 23 HAWAII L. 
REV. 685 (2001).   
 
165 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
 
166 See id. at 634. 
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which serves to penalize the exercise of [the right to interstate travel], unless shown to be 
necessary to promote a compelling government interest, is unconstitutional.167  
Shapiro used the strict scrutiny test to review penalties that infringed on the right to 
interstate travel.  Strict scrutiny, in the context of the right to travel, means that the state action 
must be “necessary to promote a compelling state interest.”168  Absent strict scrutiny, state action 
is usually reviewed under the lax rational basis standard of review.169
In Dunn v. Blumstein,170 the Court’s next major pronouncement on the right to travel and 
the poor after Shapiro,171 ”the Court clarified that the penalty factor promoted in Shapiro would 
have to burden recent migrants in a discriminatory fashion.”172  The Dunn case did not directly 
involve a claim brought by low-income individuals.173  The Court upheld the Shapiro strict 
scrutiny test as the proper standard of review.174  Importantly, for our purposes here, Dunn 
reiterated that Shapiro strict scrutiny would be triggered by classifications that penalize the right 
to travel.175  Dunn also clarified that in welfare cases involving the right to travel, it would not 
be important to show affirmative evidence that welfare recipients have in fact been deterred from 




168 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972).  
 
169 See infra note 308. 
 
170 Dunn, 405 U.S. 330. 
 
171 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), was decided between Shapiro and Dunn.  It reviewed right to travel 
penalties in the context of lowering the minimum voting age. 
 
172 Nzelibe, supra note 143, at 454-55. 
 
173 See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 331 (a professor at a university brought the equal protection claim in the case). 
 
174 Id. at 339. 
 
175 Id. at 340. 
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traveling.176 Rather, the Court noted that residency requirements penalize the right to travel by 
potentially deterring travel, even if welfare recipients have not in fact attempted to move.177  
The Dunn decision ultimately held that durational residency requirements in the context of 
voting rights violated the equal protection clause and did not survive strict scrutiny.178  
As one commentator has noted, after Dunn, the Supreme Court watered down the 
standard of review to the point where the current test may be little more than an ad-hoc balancing 
test.179 In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,180 the Supreme Court provided a more 
specific definition of state actions that penalize the right to travel.181  Memorial Hospital 
addressed whether a state’s denial of medical care to an indigent based on durational residency 
requirements infringed his right to travel.182  The Memorial Hospital Court had a difficult time 
defining what types of penalties would infringe on the right to travel and thus require strict 
scrutiny.183  Ultimately, Maricopa laid down a two-part test to help determine what constitutes a 
penalty to the right to travel: (1) denial of fundamental political rights, and (2) denial of the basic 
necessities of life.184  The Court went on to describe the limits of the penalty analysis for basic 
necessities of life: 
                                                 
 
176 See id. 
 
177 See id. at 340-41. 
 
178 Id. at 360. 
 
179 See generally Nzelibe, supra note 143, at 455, 458. 
 
180 Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974). 
 
181 Nzelibe, supra note 143, at 455. 
 
182 Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 251, 254-55. 
 
183 Id. at 256-260. 
 
184 Id. at 259. 
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Whatever the ultimate parameters of the Shapiro penalty analysis, it is at least 
clear that medical care is as much "a basic necessity of life" to an indigent as 
welfare assistance. And, governmental privileges or benefits necessary to basic 
sustenance have often been viewed as being of greater constitutional significance 
than less essential forms of governmental entitlements. It would be odd, indeed, 
to find that the [state] was required to afford [the plaintiff] welfare assistance to 
keep him from the discomfort of inadequate housing or the pangs of hunger but 
could deny him the medical care necessary to relieve him from the wheezing and 
gasping for breath that attend his illness.185
 
As Part IV explains, non-motor vehicle users could assert a claim similar to welfare or 
health care classifications that warranted protection in Memorial Hospital.  Under the Memorial 
Hospital test, lack of transportation access penalizes the right to travel at least as much as denial 
of access to welfare and health care benefits.   
In cases after Memorial Hospital, the Court continued to struggle with defining what 
constitutes a penalty to the right to travel.186 Nevertheless, the determination that a penalty exists 
remains a central factor in right to travel jurisprudence.187  In Saenz v. Roe, the Court’s most 
recent pronouncement on the right to travel, the court laid out three protections that the right to 
interstate travel guarantees: (1) the right of a citizen to enter and leave another state, (2) the right 
to be treated as a welcome visitor when temporarily present in a state, and (3) for travelers who 
become new residents of a state, the right to be treated like other citizens of the state.188  The 
Saenz Court ruled that when a state actor makes a discriminatory classification, a partial denial 
(instead of an outright denial) of benefits is enough to constitute a penalty.189
                                                 
 
185 Id. at 259-60 (internal citations omitted). 
 
186 Nzelibe, supra note 143, at 455-60. 
 
187 The court reasoned that “since the right to travel embraces the citizen’s right to be treated equally in her new 
State of residence, the discriminatory classification is itself a penalty.”  Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 (1999). 
 
188 Id. at 500. 
 
189 Id. at 504-05. 
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Even in cases where poverty is not an explicit issue, the Supreme Court tends to protect 
the transportation interests of poor people.  In United States v. Guest,190 for example, six white 
individuals were charged with harassing African Americans as they attempted to travel within 
and outside the state of Georgia.191  The defendants’ actions only indirectly implicated state 
government action, but the Court still held that “the right of interstate travel is . . . a right secured 
against interference from any source whatsoever, whether governmental or private.”192
On its face, the Guest decision had nothing to do with poverty. Neither the majority 
opinion,193 the concurrence,194 nor the dissent195 mentioned the economic status of African 
Americans living and traveling in Georgia. However, the majority opinion approvingly cited 
Edwards v. California,196 where the Court invalidated “a California law which impeded the free 
interstate passage of the indigent,” and declared that the decision was “consistent with 
precedents firmly establishing that the federal commerce power surely encompasses the 
movement in interstate commerce of persons as well as commodities.”197  
The Guest decision indicates the Court’s willingness to protect the ability of the poor to 
travel interstate.  And it is not unreasonable to assume the Court clearly understood the different 
socio-economic positions of whites and African Americans during the 1960s.  In 1966, when the 
                                                 
 
190 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).  
 
191 Id. at 746-748.  
 
192 Id. at 759.  
 
193 Id. at 746 (Stewart, J.). 
 
194 Id. at 761 (Clark, J., concurring). 
 
195 Id. at 762 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
 
196 Edwards v. Cal., 314 U.S. 172 (1941). 
 
197 Guest, 383 U.S., at 758-59 (explaining that the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, is one of the 
sources from which the Supreme Court has traditionally derived the right to interstate travel). 
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Court decided Guest, 41.8% of African Americans lived in poverty, compared to only 11.3% of 
the white population.198  
In cases where the Court has suggested or held that the right to interstate travel is not 
violated, the plaintiff has typically been able to afford expensive forms of transportation.  This 
line of jurisprudence suggests that newer, more costly forms of transportation are not entrenched 
liberties that demand respect from courts as fundamental rights.199  In Williams v. Fears, the 
Court upheld a Georgia statute that taxed employers $500 when they hired out of state 
laborers.200  The Court based its decision on the premise that the tax did not directly impact the 
right to travel of the laborers.201  Only the employer was affected, and the laborers were still free 
to travel in and out of the state at their own pleasure.202  The Court emphasized that “the right of 
locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute 
of personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any 
State is a right secured by . . . the Constitution.”203  The Court rooted the right to interstate 
travel, at the most fundamental level, as an attribute of personal liberty. 
In one of the first right to travel cases involving motor vehicles, the Supreme Court ruled 
in Hess v. Pawloski that states could put reasonable restrictions on motor vehicles using state 
                                                 
 
198 ELEANOR BAUGHER & LEATHA LAMISON WHITE, POVERTY IN THE U.S.: 1995, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
ECONOMIC AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS C-3, C-4 (1995), available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/prevcps/p60-194.pdf. 
 
199 See infra Part IV. Under federal equal protection analysis, courts look more closely at state actions that implicate 
the fundamental rights of citizens. 
 
200 Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900). 
 




203 Id. at 274.  
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highways.204  In Hess, an out of state resident hit an in-state resident.205  While the Court noted 
that a state clearly had the power to regulate the use of its own highways, the Court also put 
special emphasis on the need to regulate the safety of motor vehicles on highways. 206  The Court 
reasoned that before a non-resident motorist could operate a motor vehicle within the state, the 
state could require her to appoint an official or agent within state on whom process must be 
served in the event of an accident.207
 Other Supreme Court decisions have also restricted the rights of individuals to use more 
expensive or dangerous transportation modes.  For example, in Hendrick v. Maryland, the 
District of Columbia required non-residents to register their cars before operating within city 
limits.208  The Court upheld the registration requirement as a reasonable use of the police power, 
and noted that “the movement of motor vehicles over the highways is attended by constant and 
serious dangers to the public, and is also abnormally destructive to the ways themselves.”209  In 
another case, the Court ruled that state taxes on airline passengers were not an inhibition on 
interstate travel; rather, the taxes helped fund airport operations and benefited the public good.210
 In sum, while the ability to reasonably regulate interstate travel does not offend the right 
to travel interstate, the Court has been much more willing to allow burdens on travel that affect 
                                                 
 
204 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). 
 
205 Id. at 353. 
 
206 Id. at 356 (“Motor vehicles are dangerous machines, and, even when skillfully and carefully operated, their use is 
attended by serious dangers to persons and property. In the public interest the state may make and enforce 
regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and non-residents alike, who use its 
highways.”). 
 
207 Id. at 354. 
 
208 Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 619 (1915).  
 
209 Id. at 622.  
 
210 Evansville-Vandenburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972). 
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individuals who can afford other means of travel.211  When the plaintiffs are either poor or 
indigent, the Court has been willing to find a constitutional violation of the right to interstate 
travel.212
 
B. The Constitutional Right to Intrastate Travel. 
 
 Similar to the discussion of the right to interstate travel, there is no shortage of literature 
that addresses the existence and implications of intrastate travel.213  There is thus no need to 
delve into a general review of the topic.  Intrastate travel refers to journeys that occur solely 
within one state.  The right to intrastate travel is important because it helps define the contours of 
the rights of non-motor vehicle travelers.214  Alternative transportation users would enjoy more 
constitutional projection if a court recognizes and protects intrastate travel.215  
Contrary to interstate travel jurisprudence, the Court has explicitly decided not to decide 
whether a constitutional right to intrastate travel exists.  In 1974, the Court decided Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County, and declared, “[a] constitutional distinction between interstate and 
                                                 
 
211 The more dangerous or risky the form of transportation, the more likely the Supreme Court seems willing to 
regulate it. See Hess v. Pawloksi, supra note 204, at 40-41 (finding that the automobile is dangerous and should be 
regulated as a mode of travel). 
 
212 As one commentator has noted, the “contours [of the right to travel] are blurry and ill-defined.”  Nzelibe, supra 
note 143, at 463.  Nzelibe theorizes that “the claim of a right to travel provided a judicial vehicle for righting the 
wrong of legislative apathy towards the poor by the states--a judicial power that otherwise was limited by [other 
cases denying the poor constitutional rights such as housing and education].”  Id.   
 
213 See, e.g., Bruce Epperson, Permitted But Not Intended: Boub v. Township of Wayne, Municipal Tort Immunity in 
Illinois, and the Right to Local Travel, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 545 (2004); Matthew Dombrowski, Comment, 
Securing Access for the Urban Poor, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (2005); Nicole Hyland, Comment, On the Road 
Again: How Much Mileage is Left on the Privileges and Immunities Clause and How Far Will It Travel?, 70 
FORDHAM L. REV. 187 (2001); Andrew Porter, Comment, Toward a Constitutional Analysis of the Right to 
Intrastate Travel, 86 NW. U.L. REV. 820 (1992). 
 
214 Recall that the right to interstate travel protects three types of privileges.  See supra note 189. 
 
215 See infra Part IV. 
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intrastate travel, [is] a question we do not now consider.”216  Since then, the Court has remained 
silent on the issue.217   
In the absence of a definitive ruling from the Supreme Court, federal appellate courts 
have split on the issue of the existence of a right to intrastate travel.218  Despite this circuit split, 
the federal appellate decisions have followed a similar trend to the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence involving the right to interstate travel.  When viewed through the lens of the 
economic status of the traveler, the circuit decisions follow a discernible pattern.219  One outlier 
circuit exists -- the Third Circuit -- and it will be discussed at the end of this section.220
 In the circuits that recognize a right to intrastate travel, case law looks sympathetically at 
the economic and social class of the individual affected by the restriction.  In Johnson v. City of 
Cincinnati, the Sixth Circuit recognized the right to intrastate travel.221  The plaintiffs were 
barred by local ordinance from an area of the city because of past criminal convictions.222  
Because of the travel restriction, one of the plaintiffs, a homeless man, could not visit his 
lawyer’s office because it was in the restricted zone.223  The other plaintiff was a grandmother 
who could not legally visit her grandchildren after she was banned from the geographic area.224  
                                                 
 
216 Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974).  
 
217 Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 712 (8th Cir. 2005).  
 
218 Id. at 712-13.  
 
219 See infra pp. 44-48. 
 
220 See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 




223 Id. at 505. 
 
224 Id. at 503. 
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The grandmother needed to travel to the grandchildren’s home to help raise them and take them 
to school.225  The Sixth Circuit rejected the ban, finding that “due process . . . demands some 
individualized consideration before an individual’s right to localized travel can be restricted.”226  
The court was particularly concerned that the travel restriction denied the plaintiffs access to 
basic needs like food, shelter, and social and educational services.227
 In King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, the Second Circuit recognized the 
right to intrastate travel in a case involving housing and welfare recipients.228  The local housing 
authority issued a rule that required individuals to reside in the state for five continuous years 
before becoming eligible for public housing.229  All of the plaintiffs affected in the case 
supported families, and at least two of the three plaintiffs received public assistance.230  The 
court reinforced the right to intrastate travel in strong terms, reasoning that “it would be 
meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal 
liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state.”231  The 
court also noted that the residency restriction penalized the new residents as a class by forcing 
them to wait longer than their in-state peers.232




226 Id. at 504.  
 
227 Id. at 503. 
 
228 King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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 In the circuits that hold no right to intrastate travel exists, the individuals affected in the 
cases tend to be either from a higher income bracket or considered less worthy of protection.  In 
Wright v. City of Jackson, for example, the Fifth Circuit upheld a city ordinance requiring that all 
city employees reside within city limits.233  The court ruled the ordinance was related to a 
legitimate government purpose, and that there was no “fundamental ‘right to commute.’”234  
Sex offenders do not fare any better with courts that reject the right to intrastate travel.  In 
Doe v. City of Lafayette, the Seventh Circuit held that a sex offender ban in public parks did not 
give rise to a right to intrastate travel claim.235  The court defined any supposed intrastate travel 
right narrowly – by considering whether or not the right to enter a public park was “implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty.”236  In Doe v. Miller, the Eighth Circuit pursued similar reasoning 
to Lafayette, holding that a restriction of sex offenders living near schools did not implicate any 
potential right to intrastate travel.237  
In Miller, the court ruled that the state statute did not prevent a sex offender from 
entering or leaving any part of the state (including travel near schools), and that the statute did 
not erect a barrier to intrastate movement.238  The Eighth Circuit also noted that “the decisions 
finding infringement of a fundamental right to intrastate travel have involved laws that trigger 
                                                 
 
233 Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900, 901 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 
234 Id. at 902; see also Andre v. Bd. of Trs. of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 
235 Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004).  
 
236 Id. at 771-74.  Perhaps the court defined the right narrowly because the law regulated a morally reprehensible 
group – sex offenders.  In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court also narrowly defined a right against what it 
probably considered a morally reprehensible group – homosexuals.  Bowers v. Hardwick, 47 U.S. 186 (1986).  In 
Bowers, the Court ruled there was no constitutional right to the narrow issue sodomy, id. at 189, when it probably 
could have based its decision on the more broad constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 205-06 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
 
237 Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).  
 
238 Id. at 713. 
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concerns not present here – interference with free ingress to and egress from certain parts of a 
State, or treatment of new residents of a locality less favorably than existing residents.”239  
The Eighth Circuit seemed to reason that sex offenders still have the liberty to travel 
anywhere in the state, even if they are prohibited from living near schools.  On one level, the 
Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Miller directly conflicts with the Supreme Court’s interstate travel 
welfare benefits jurisprudence.240  The welfare cases hold that residency restrictions that restrict 
access to benefits are unconstitutional violations of the right to travel.241  The law that prohibited 
sex offenders from living near schools could also be seen as a penalty that restricts access the 
privilege of choosing one’s home.  The Eighth Circuit probably saw sex offenders as a very 
different class than poor individuals needing economic assistance, and drew a distinction 
between a privilege and a benefit.    
The Third Circuit takes a unique approach to the right to intrastate travel, and in many 
ways it represents a compromise in the current circuit split.  In Lutz v. City of York, the court 
delved into a detailed search for a constitutional source to the right of intrastate travel.242  The 
case turned on the constitutionality of a “cruising” ordinance that prohibited driving a motor 
vehicle repeatedly in a loop at certain hours of the day.243  The plaintiff challenged the law as 
facially invalid because it violated the right to intrastate travel.244  The court first reviewed the 
source of the constitutional right to intrastate travel, and ultimately settled on substantive due 
                                                 
 
239 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 




242 Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
243 Id. at 257 (the ordinance at issue restricted passing the same point twice between 7:00 p.m. and 3:30 a.m. during 
any two hour period). 
 
244 Id. at 261.  
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process inherent in the Fifth Amendment.245  The Third Circuit concluded that “the right to 
move freely about one’s neighborhood or town, even by automobile, is indeed ‘implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty’ and ‘deeply rooted in the Nation’s history.’”246  The Lutz court also 
made the cryptic statement that:   
The right or tradition we consider may be described as the right to 
travel locally through public spaces and roadways. Under [the 
City of] York's view, a state or local government could 
constitutionally prohibit all freedom of movement that does not 
involve interstate migration, interstate commerce, business 
between a citizen and the federal government, and (presumably) 
travel incident to otherwise protected activity. Conceivably this 
result could be made less implausible by attempting to distinguish 
a more particularized, protected tradition of travel or wandering 
on foot . . . from an unprotected tradition of localized travel by 
automobile. But accepting that distinction would imply the 
constitutionality of the limited travel ban described above, 
enforced exclusively by state control of the public roadways. It 
would permit, for example, the prohibition of simply "going for a 
ride" through one's neighborhood, so long as the prohibition 
could be effected without burdening the protected forms of travel 
and justified by any legitimate state purpose it conceivably 
furthered.247
 
 The court’s comments suggest the Third Circuit would protect all forms of transportation 
from regulations that burden intrastate travel.  The court also seemed to acknowledge that there 
may indeed be a constitutionally protected right to walk, and it arguably extended this 
constitutional right to include a protected interest in driving a car.  However, the implications of 
recognizing such a right would be enormous, and go against Supreme Court precedent allowing 
the restriction of travel modes.248
                                                 
 
245 Id. at 258-68. 
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 In the end, the Third Circuit found a way to uphold the cruising ordinance in Lutz.249  
Borrowing from First Amendment jurisprudence, the court created a new intermediate scrutiny 
review test to analyze the substantive due process right to drive an automobile.250  The court then 
applied the new test and upheld the city ordinance, finding that the City of York had a significant 
interest in ensuring public safety and reducing congestion.251  But, as we will soon see, the Lutz 
court’s reasoning went against established precedent that disfavors the automobile as a 
transportation mode.  The Lutz decision falls into the netherworld of jurisprudence between the 





A. The Strong Presumption Against Choice of Transportation Mode. 
 
 The presumption against choice of transportation mode in right to travel jurisprudence 
began with Monarch Travel Services v. Associated Cultural Clubs. 254  In Monarch, the Ninth 
                                                                                                                                                             
248 See, e.g., Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977) (finding that it is within the state’s police power to revoke a 
driver’s license and refuse an individual’s right to drive).  
 
249 Lutz v. York, 899 F.2d 255, 270 (3d. Cir. 1990). 
 
250 Id. at 268-70.  
 
251 Id. at 270. 
 
252 See infra Part III.B.  
 
253 At least one court has used Lutz as precedent in analyzing the right to travel as a fundamental right subject to 
intermediate scrutiny. See Townes v. City of St. Louis, 949 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Mo. 1996).  
 
254 Monarch Travel Servs. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, 466 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1972). 
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Circuit reviewed a statute that regulated air carriers.255  The defendant in the case argued that the 
regulations led to higher ticket prices, and that not everyone could afford to pay the higher prices 
to travel to Europe.256  In the defendant’s view, the regulation violated the constitutional right to 
travel.257
 The Monarch court ruled that higher prices caused by the regulations did not violate the 
right to travel.258  The court reasoned, “higher air tariffs will limit travel of those who cannot pay 
the price.  A rich man can choose to drive a limousine; a poor man may have to walk.  The poor 
man's lack of choice in his mode of travel may be unfortunate, but it is not unconstitutional.”259  
Of course, the court left out the point that it is literally impossible to walk to Europe. 
 Shanks v. Forsyth County Park Authority is another example rejecting protection of a 
particular travel mode. 260  The Shanks court reviewed the constitutionality of a statute that 
banned motorcycles from a park.261  Even while assuming that the right to intrastate travel 
existed, the court found that the ban did not affect a travel right because it only regulated a 
particular method of travel.262  The court reasoned, “[p]eople are free to travel inside the Park 
through other methods of travel such as by foot, car, bicycle, etc.  As such, the ban on 
                                                 
 
255 Id. at 553-54. 
 
256 Id. at 554. 
 






260 Shanks v. Forsyth County Park Auth., 869 F. Supp. 1231 (M.D.N.C 1994).  
 
261 Id.  
 
262 Id. at 1238. 
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motorcycles does not impede a person’s right to travel but merely regulates the method of travel 
once inside the Park.”263    
 Other courts have almost uniformly rejected an implied right to choose a transportation 
mode in right to travel cases, and most cite to Monarch or its companion case in the Ninth 
Circuit, Miller v. Reed.264  However, reliance by other courts on Monarch and Miller for a 
blanket restriction in choosing a transportation mode goes too far.  Monarch addressed a fact 
situation involving airplanes that traveled internationally.265  As such, it implicated the right to 
international travel, not the right to travel interstate or intrastate.  The Supreme Court has 
consistently held international travel to different standards than travel within the United 
States.266
 In Miller, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff did not have a fundamental “right to 
drive” an automobile, and that a state could constitutionally revoke a driver’s license.267  The 
court also noted that “we have previously held that burdens on a single mode of transportation do 
not implicate the right to interstate travel.”268  In support of its reasoning, in addition to citing 
                                                 
 
263 Id.  
 
264 Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 1999).  Some of the cases that cite Miller or Monarch include Ducan v. 
Cone, No. 00-5705, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33221 (6th Cir. filed Dec. 7, 2000) (finding that there is no fundamental 
right to drive a car); Avery v. Perrsyburg Mun. Court Prosecutor, No. 05-7246, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13433 (N.D. 
Ohio 2005 filed Jul. 6 2005) (holding that restrictions on a single mode of transportation do not rise to the level of a 
violation of the fundamental right to interstate travel); Tutor v. City of Hailey, No. 02-475-S-BLW, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 28354 (D. Idaho 2005 filed Apr. 6, 2005) (holding there is no right to travel by private jet). 
 
265 Monarch Travel Servs. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, 466 F.2d 552, 553 (9th Cir. 1972). 
 
266 See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (reasoning that international travel implicates national security 
issues and should be measured under a different standard than the right to interstate travel); Califano v. Aznavorian, 
439 U.S. 170 (1978) (finding that statutes that implicated the right to international travel cannot be reviewed under 
the same constitutional standard as statutes that implicate the right to interstate travel). 
 
267 Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 
268 Id. at 1205.  
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Monarch, the Miller court relied upon two other cases – City of Houston v. FAA269 and 
Berberian v. Petit.270   
 City of Houston reviewed an airport travel restriction that prevented airplanes from flying 
particular routes.271  The court rejected the argument that the restriction burdened the right to 
travel, noting “[the] argument reduces to the feeble claim that passengers have a constitutional 
right to the most convenient form of travel.  That notion, as any experienced traveler can attest, 
finds no support whatsoever [in case law].”272
 In Berberian, the court ruled: 
The plaintiff's argument that the right to operate a motor vehicle 
is fundamental because of its relation to the fundamental right of 
interstate travel is utterly frivolous. The plaintiff is not being 
prevented from traveling interstate by public transportation, by 
common carrier, or in motor vehicle driven by someone with a 
license to drive it. What is at issue here is not his right to travel 
interstate, but his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public 
highways, and we have no hesitation in holding that this is not a 
fundamental right.273
 
 The Berberian and City of Houston decisions drive home the point that an individual 
does not have a right to the most convenient form of travel.  But they do not address the situation 
in which there is only one method of reaching a destination.  In Berberian, the court went so far 
as to specifically mention that it might rule differently if the case involved public transportation, 
                                                 
 
269 City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 
270 Berberian v. Petit, 374 A.2d 791 (R.I. 1977).  
 
271 City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1194 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 
272 Id. at 1198. 
 
273 Berberian v. Petit, 372 A.2d 791, 794 (R.I. 1977) (internal citations omitted) (cited in Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 
1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999)).   
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instead of a private automobile.274  The Miller case involved a private automobile, and Monarch 
implicated international airplane travel.  In short, the facts in these cases, unlike the facts in the 
Supreme Court’s interstate travel jurisprudence, do not involve situations in which the people are 
unable to choose another travel mode within the United States.  
 
B. Supreme Court Freedom of Movement Jurisprudence 
 
 Unlike the lower court cases that find no protected interest in choosing a transportation 
mode, 275 Supreme Court cases that invoke the freedom of movement nearly always involve 
personal liberty.276 Federal appellate courts, when not looking explicitly at a particular 
transportation mode, have also recognized a freedom of movement.277  The Court has defined 
freedom of movement as the right to free movement inside a nation’s frontiers, and it seems to 
include the right to remain in a public place on foot.278  The Supreme Court has never explicitly 
recognized freedom of movement as an explicit fundamental right,279 and federal appellate 
courts are currently split over whether or not such a right exists.280
                                                 
 
274 Berberian v. Petit, 372 A.2d 791, 794 (R.I. 1977). 
 
275 See supra Part III.A. 
 
276 See, e.g., Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900) (“The right to remove from one place to another according 
to inclination . . . is an attribute of personal liberty”) (cited in Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 497 (6th 
Cir. 2002)).   
 
277 See, e.g., Gomez v. Turner, 672 F.2d 134, 143-44 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“walk[ing] the streets, without explanation or 
formal papers is surely among the cherished liberties that distinguish this nation from so many others”).  
 
278 See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 54 (1999). 
 
279 Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 535-39 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  
 
280 Compare Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002) with Hutchins v. Dist. of Columbia, 188 
F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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 Nevertheless, Supreme Court cases strongly suggest that, at the very least, a fundamental 
right to travel on foot exists.  In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, the Court struck down a 
vagrancy statute in which two individuals were arrested while walking down a sidewalk.281  
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, described walking as a basic “amenit[y] of life,”282 and 
quoted Henry David Thoreau for the proposition that “every walk is a sort of crusade, preached 
by some Peter the Hermit in us, to go forth and reconquer this Holy Land from the hands of the 
Infidels.”283  Justice Douglas’s language is not what one reads in the garden variety Supreme 
Court decision, but the implications are unmistakable. Justice Douglas thought it was important 
to protect walking, even if it is “not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights.”284
 In Kolender v. Lawson, the Court also protected an individual’s right to walk.285  
Kolender involved a statute that allowed police to stop any person walking on the street and ask 
for identification.286  The Court struck down the statute, reasoning that the right to walk the 
public streets implicated freedom of movement.287
 In its freedom of movement jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has also addressed the 
ability of individuals to maintain a livelihood.  In Kent v. Dulles, the court said, “[f]reedom of 
movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our 
heritage . . .[T]ravel within a country, may be necessary for a livelihood.  It may be as close to 
                                                 
 
281 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).  
 






285 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).  
 
286 Id. at 358.  
 
287 Id. (“Our concern here is based upon . . .  First Amendment liberties . . .  [and] consideration of the constitutional 
right to freedom of movement.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads.  Freedom of 
movement is basic in our scheme of values.”288  However, it is important to note that Kent and 
its successor case, Aptheker v. Secretary of State, both involved international travel.  Also, most 
of the Justices’ reasoning discussing freedom of association resides in dictum.289
 Further complicating the situation is the Supreme Court’s long line of jurisprudence 
upholding a state’s power to regulate use of its public roads.290  Lower courts have vigorously 
upheld a state’s right to impose regulations that ostensibly make roads safer.291 Lower courts 
also allow regulations that limit individuals’ behavior while using transportation modes, such as 
rules that require motorcyclists to wear helmets.292
 
Part IV – Analysis and Conclusion 
 
 In the final analysis, federal case law is in conflict with itself.  The Supreme Court and 
lower courts protect interstate and intrastate travel when cases include factual situations that 
affect the poorer members of society.293  The right to walk, in particular, receives strong support 
in the Supreme Court’s amorphous freedom of movement doctrine.294  But, lower courts have 
                                                 
 
288 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958); see also Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964). 
 
289 Kent, 357 U.S. 116; Aptheker, 378 U.S. 500 (both cases review the denial of passports based on political belief). 
 
290 See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (holding that a state can reasonably restrict uses on its 
public streets); see also supra p. 11. 
 
291 See, e.g., United States v. Hare, 308 F. Supp. 2d 955 (D. Neb. 2004). 
 
292 See, e.g., Love v. Bell, 465 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1970). 
 
293 See supra Part II.  
 
294 See supra Part III.B. 
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repeatedly and unanimously rejected the right of an individual to choose one particular travel 
mode.295
 The poor person, especially in today’s transportation environment, is left in a quandary.  
In Monarch, the Ninth Circuit justified its rejection of a right to select a travel mode by stating 
that if a person cannot afford another mode,296 “[the] poor man may have to walk.”297  But 
public transportation frequently does not serve areas where new jobs are created, and today’s 
transportation infrastructure makes it difficult or unsafe to walk (or bicycle) on much of the 
transportation system.298
 In interstate travel and freedom of movement jurisprudence, the Supreme Court seems 
most concerned with removing restrictions on personal liberty.299  In intrastate travel 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has not yet spoken definitively on the issue, and the circuit 
courts are split.300  But most circuit courts, even in the cryptic Lutz decision, seem to recognize 
that transportation access for basic services is protected under the Constitution.301  In future right 
to travel cases, judges will have to reconcile a poor person’s theoretical liberty to move within 
and across states with the fact that many living in poverty have no access to basic services and 
jobs because they are unable to afford a car.302  
                                                 
 
295 See supra Part III.A.  
 
296 An analysis of the transportation rights of individuals with disabilities is beyond the scope of this comment. 
 
297 Monarch Travel Servs. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, 466 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1972). 
 
298 See supra Part I. 
 
299 See supra pp. 39-40. 
 




302 See supra Part I. 
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 Before the rise of modern roadway engineering and the automobile, alternative travel 
modes were popular.  Individuals from all socio-economic backgrounds were able to move 
throughout the country.303  Bicycling, walking, and public transportation were all viable modes 
of transportation.304  Since the Great Depression, however, the United States has become 
increasingly reliant on the automobile for transportation.  Today, in many areas of the country, it 
is practically impossible to reach a destination with any form of transportation other than an 
automobile.305
 Perhaps the most promising legal doctrine to protect the travel rights of poor individuals 
is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.306  In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the principle that the Equal Protection Clause requires that all persons in 
similar circumstances should be treated alike.307  The Plyler Court noted that, ”[i]n applying the 
Equal Protection Clause to most forms of state action, [the Court] seek[s] only the assurance that 
the classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a legitimate state purpose.”308  
However, the Plyler Court went on to remark: 
But we would not be faithful to our obligations under the Fourteenth 
Amendment if we applied so deferential a standard to every 
classification. The Equal Protection Clause was intended as a 
restriction on state legislative action inconsistent with elemental 
constitutional premises. Thus we have treated as presumptively 
invidious those classifications that disadvantage a "suspect class," or 
that impinge upon the exercise of a "fundamental right." With respect 
                                                 
 






306 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 
307 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982). 
 
308 Id. at 216. 
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to such classifications, it is appropriate to enforce the mandate of 
equal protection by requiring the State to demonstrate that its 
classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest. In addition, we have recognized that certain 
forms of legislative classification, while not facially invidious, 
nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties; in these 
limited circumstances we have sought the assurance that the 
classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of 
equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as 
furthering a substantial interest of the State.309
 
 Right to travel cases involving the poor have often implicated the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  While “the right to travel jurisprudence is somewhat 
muddled,”310 the “Supreme Court has stated . . . [that] in reality, right to travel analysis refers to 
little more than a particular application of equal protection analysis.”311  The Equal Protection 
Clause does not create the right to interstate or intrastate travel.312  Rather, it is a method of relief 
for state actions that infringe on the right to travel.313
 Under federal equal protection doctrine, state actions that impede an individual’s ability 
to travel receive judicial review under the rational basis test or some higher form of judicial 
                                                 
 
309 Id. at 216-17 (internal citations omitted). 
 
310 Westenfelder v. Ferguson, 998 F. Supp. 146, 150, 151 n.6 (D.R.I. 1998) (explaining that some right to travel 
cases have been decided using a lax rational basis test under equal protection, while other cases have employed 
higher standards of review); see also Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990) (deriving the right to 
intrastate travel and employing an intermediate scrutiny standard of review). 
 
311 Westenfelder, 998 F. Supp. at 151 n.6 (D.R.I. 1998) (internal citations omitted).  The Westenfelder court went on 
to apply strict scrutiny to actions that impeded the right to interstate travel.  Id. at 151.  
 
312 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (grounding different parts of the right to interstate travel in the Privileges 
and Immunities Clauses); Lutz, 899 F.2d 255 (deriving the right to intrastate travel from substantive due process). 
 
313 Lutz, 899 F.2d at 266. 
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scrutiny.314  Courts analyze equal protection claims under strict scrutiny if state action involves a 
fundamental right or a suspect class.315  
 Most laws, regulations, and other state actions relating to transportation are facially 
neutral because they do not explicitly single out one group.  The only conceivable facial 
classification would probably claim that state action favors automobile drivers over other 
transportation users; but this is hardly within the realm of what the Supreme Court would 
consider a suspect classification.316  However, state action involving transportation almost 
certainly involves interstate or intrastate travel, and could presumably penalize travel implicated 
as a fundamental right.317  
 The non-motor-vehicle user has a colorable claim using a fundamental rights approach 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Generally, in cases involving fundamental rights, the plaintiff 
does not need to show that she is part of a suspect class.318  But in right to travel cases, “[e]qual 
protection focuses on whether there is disparity in treatment among a class of individuals on the 
basis of the exercise of a fundamental right.”319  The relevant inquiry is whether the citizen’s 
right to travel has been penalized.320  One of the ways in which state action penalizes the right to 
travel occurs when a state’s classification denies a basic necessity of life.321
                                                 
 




316 Cf. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 265-266 (finding that a law regulating the use of a transportation mode does not create a 
suspect or quasi suspect classification).  
 
317 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504-05 (explaining that the fundamental rights test applies to equal protection analysis 
when state action acts as a penalty to traveling interstate); Westenfelder v. Ferguson, 998 F. Supp. 146, 151-52 
(D.R.I. 1998). 
 
318 See supra note 309 and accompanying text. 
 
319 Nzelibe, supra note 143, at 454. 
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 A right to travel claim based on lack of transportation access is unlikely to succeed as a 
stand-alone claim, even though most Americans travel daily to accomplish all sorts of tasks.322  
One commentator, Jide Nzelibe, has convincingly pointed out that the Supreme Court’s right to 
travel jurisprudence is confusing and conflated.323  In particular, the Court has a difficult time 
determining: (1) what constitutes a penalty to the right to travel,324 (2) what constitutes basic 
necessities of life,325 and (3) the proper constitutional test to apply to classifications that penalize 
the right to travel.326 From a practical point of view, as Nzelibe argues, a court would probably 
analyze a fundamental rights claim involving the right to travel327 using an ad-hoc balancing test 
that measures the amount of penalty involved in the state action.328         
 States do not explicitly discriminate between motor vehicle and non-motor vehicle users, 
and generally do not enact laws that preclude citizens from driving motor vehicles that are 
                                                                                                                                                             
320 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505 (finding that California’s denial of welfare benefits penalized the plaintiff); Mem’l Hosp. 
v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974). 
 
321 Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 259.  
 
322 See supra Part I. 
 
323 See generally Nzelibe, supra note 143. 
 
324 Id. at 455, 457. 
 
325 Id. at 458. 
 
326 Id. (arguing that the Court’s jurisprudence in practice functions more like the intermediate scrutiny test under the 
Comity Clause than the standard strict scrutiny test utilized to protect fundamental rights). 
 
327 If a court were to protect individual transportation modes, walking would be the most likely to received 
protection as a fundamental right.  Logically, if one accepts that courts often look to history and tradition to derive 
fundamental rights in applying strict scrutiny analysis, see generally Adam B. Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: 
Tradition and Fundamental Rights, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 101 (2002) (explaining that courts often use history and 
tradition to derive fundamental rights), the ability to walk on public roads is surely worthy of heightened 
constitutional protection.  Walking, by its very nature, has been around since humans have been able to stand on two 
feet.  Justice Douglas called walking a “basic amenity of life,” and ample case law exists that implicitly protects 
walking as a travel mode.  See supra Part II.B. Applying history and tradition to individual travel modes, motor 
vehicles are the least likely form of ground transportation to receive constitutional protection; they came into wide 
use after the train, bicycle, and boat gained prominence. 
 
328 See generally Nzelibe, supra note 143, at 457-58. 
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outside the scope of valid exercises of the police power.329  Any citizen can drive a car if they 
can afford it -- regardless of whether they happen to be a new resident or a visitor of a state.  In 
order to find the right to travel “penalized,” a court would have to hold that the high cost of 
owning an automobile is a penalty per se, and possibly that the right to intrastate travel exists.  
Given the large catalogue of jurisprudence that does not protect an individual’s right to use 
particular travel modes, courts seem unlikely to protect non-motor vehicle users under the 
fundamental rights rubric by itself.  Nevertheless, defining the right to travel as fundamental 
might help define the contours of a suspect class of poor people for the purposes of challenging 
the lack of transportation options under equal protection.  
  Under the Supreme Court’s equal protection doctrine of total deprivation,330 poor 
individuals could make the claim that they cannot afford a motor vehicle and are thus totally 
deprived of transportation mobility.  If a “total deprivation” argument were combined with a 
right to travel claim, the Supreme Court would be faced with an argument that is very similar to 
its prior cases.331  The grouping of poor people as a suspect class provides the discrimination 
required to bring the claim that state action penalizes the fundamental right to travel.  And if a 
court recognizes a right to intrastate travel, non-motor vehicle users would have a cause of action 
even if they were not engaging in acts traditionally protected under interstate travel 
jurisprudence.332  If the right to intrastate travel exists, non-motor vehicle users operating 
completely within a state could also receive constitutional protection.       
                                                 
 
329 See supra p. 11. 
 
330 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973).  
 
331 See supra Part II.A (describing cases where the Court considered whether the right to travel was “penalized” by 
state classifications of poor people). 
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 The total deprivation doctrine reached fruition in San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez, where poor citizens in Texas challenged the state’s school funding 
system.333  The Supreme Court rejected the claim, and held that no federal fundamental right to 
education exists.334  However, the Court also stated, “[t]he individuals, or groups of individuals, 
who constituted the class discriminated against in our prior cases shared two distinguishing 
characteristics: because of their impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired 
benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful 
opportunity to enjoy that benefit.”335  Crucial to the Court’s factual analysis was the fact that the 
people impacted did not show they were indigent or beneath “any designated poverty level.”336  
San Antonio also reasoned that no constitutional violation occurs when the state creates an 
adequate substitute for the desired benefit.337
 This language opened the door for future Equal Protection Clause suspect classification 
claims based on total deprivation due to poverty.  Under the total deprivation doctrine, even if 
the state classification is rationally related to a state interest, the court must find that the state 
action satisfies strict scrutiny.338  To date, however, this author is not aware of any case that has 
invoked the total deprivation doctrine in the context of the right to travel. 
                                                                                                                                                             
332 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999) (defining the right to interstate travel as encompassing the right to enter 
and leave a state, visit a state, and move to a new state). 
 
333 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 4-6. 
 
334 Id. at 45. 
 
335 Id. at 21 (arguing that earlier classifications involving indigents were properly labeled suspect classifications and 
subject to heightened scrutiny).  
 
336 Id. at 22-23. 
 
337 See id. at 21. 
 
338 Id. at 21-25.  
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 The total deprivation standard laid out in San Antonio is extremely hard to meet.  The 
Court’s general rule for equal protection claims holds that “[i]f a legislative classification or 
distinction neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold [it] so 
long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”339  The lack of wealth, in and of 
itself, does not create a suspect classification for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.340  
Indeed, the Supreme Court “has held repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect 
classification.”341  The key difference in the transportation context, versus a standard poverty 
claim involving equal protection, is that the right to travel implicates both the total deprivation 
doctrine (and thus a suspect classification) and the fundamental right to travel.  Together, a total 
deprivation/right to travel argument fuses the various strands of transportation jurisprudence and 
demonstrates that a penalty has occurred that infringes the right to travel.  Total deprivation and 
right to travel arguments combine notions of individual liberty in cases like Williams v. Fears342 
and freedom of movement jurisprudence343 with the broader notions of class protection evident 
in many of the interstate and intrastate travel cases. 
 Abundant evidence exists to show that increasing numbers of poor Americans are totally 
deprived of the right to travel.344  The primary transportation engineering manual in the United 
States puts the needs of motor vehicles squarely ahead of alternative forms of transportation.345  
                                                 
 
339 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (internal citations omitted). 
 
340 Unites States v. Myers, 294 F.3d 203, 209 (1st Cir. 2002).  
 
341 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980). 
 
342 See supra note pp. 39-40.  
 
343 See supra Part III.B. 
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For decades, transportation policy focused on enabling motor vehicle use at the expense of other 
transportation modes.346  Large numbers of people below the poverty line are unable to flee from 
natural disasters, and these individuals tend to be African American.347  The average cost of 
operating a motor vehicle is now over $8000 per year.348  The average individual on welfare 
cannot afford a car, and less than half of all jobs in the United States are accessible by public 
transportation.349
 These overwhelming facts appear to satisfy the total deprivation doctrine laid out in San 
Antonio.  Many of the poor individuals that need transportation access are below the poverty 
line, they have no adequate replacement for the desired benefit in the form of public 
transportation, and they suffer from a total deprivation of significant portions of the 
transportation system.  Seen through this lens, the total deprivation doctrine avoids the problems 
associated with a stand-alone fundamental rights analysis involving the right to travel,350 and 
remains faithful to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that protects the travel rights of poorer 
members of society. 
 Could a state justify state action that limits non-motor vehicle use under a total 
deprivation challenge?  This remains an open question, and by no means an easy one.  A 
reviewing court could apply intermediate scrutiny to intrastate travel litigation351 or strict 






348 See supra note 8. 
 
349 See supra note 45. 
 
350 See supra pp. 64-65.  Using the total deprivation doctrine to protect the right to travel avoids the problems of (1) 
having no definable group of persons that have been penalized, and (2) deciding which constitutional test to use to 
protect the right to travel.  
 
351 See, e.g, Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 268-70 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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scrutiny to interstate travel cases.352  As in Lutz, a court might easily find that restrictions on 
automobiles are a significant state interest.353  However, in the context of poverty and lack of 
mobility, a court could also easily find that deprivation of transportation access can not be 
justified by policy arguments — particularly when public transportation, bicycling, and walking 
accommodation exist as feasible solutions.  In the end, courts will have to decide whether the 
transportation rights involved are significant enough to be considered “penalties” that warrant 
interference with legislative policy decisions.     
 It will probably remain true that a rich man will drive in a limousine, while a poor man 
will have to walk. Nevertheless, the total deprivation doctrine of the Equal Protection Clause 
offers a legitimate pathway towards protecting the rights of poor individuals to walk, bicycle, 
and use public transportation.  The Supreme Court’s repeated protection of poorer individuals’ 
travel rights indicates that total deprivation claims have a significant likelihood of success.354  
Non-automobile users finally have the vehicle they need to achieve a balanced transportation 
system.355   
 This Comment has endeavored to show that some forms of transportation do not have to 
be more equal than others.  While the Monarch decision and its progeny suggest the non-
existence of a constitutional right to use a particular travel mode, Supreme Court case law 
                                                 
 
352 See, e.g., Mem’l Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256-60 (1974). 
 
353 See supra p. 49.  
 
354 If the Supreme Court is willing to rule that residency requirements for welfare benefits infringe on the right to 
travel, they should also be willing to rule that direct restrictions, like a complete denial of access to the 
transportation system, violate constitutional rights. 
 
355 It is very possible that if a total deprivation equal protection claim did come before the Court, transportation 
experts would dispute whether or not individuals have been completely denied transportation access.  In an ironic 
twist, advocates promoting the same form of transportation would likely disagree.  Some bicycle experts, for 
example, would argue that cyclists could safely ride on a road even if they do not feel safe, while other experts 
would probably claim a total deprivation of access.  See supra note 55.   
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remains sympathetic to a person with no travel options.356  Neither the Supreme Court, nor the 
lower courts, has considered a case where an individual, either by choice or because of poverty, 
literally has no way of reaching a destination absent a motor vehicle.  Considering the general 
state of the transportation infrastructure in the United States, particularly in rural areas, it is 
certainly possible to imagine such a scenario.357  If such a case ever does wind its way through 
the courts, ample Supreme Court and lower court case law exists to maintain that an individual 
does have a right to reach a destination, at least through an inexpensive and reasonable means 
like bicycling or walking.  In sum, the constitutional right to travel, combined with the total 
deprivation doctrine under the Equal Protection Clause, can help reverse America’s addiction to 
the automobile. 
                                                 
 
356 See supra Parts II, III.  
 
357 See Surface Transportation Policy Project, Transportation and Social Equity, (finding that 36% of all rural 
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